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ABSTRACT 
With the proliferation of digital based evidence, the need for the timely 
identification, analysis and interpretation of digital evidence is becoming more 
crucial. In many investigations critical information is required while at the scene 
or within a short period of time - measured in hours as opposed to days. The 
traditional cyber forensics approach of seizing a system(s)/media, transporting it 
to the lab, making a forensic image(s), and then searching the entire system for 
potential evidence, is no longer appropriate in some circumstances. In cases such 
as child abductions, pedophiles, missing or exploited persons, time is of the 
essence. In these types of cases, investigators dealing with the suspect or crime 
scene need investigative leads quickly; in some cases it is the difference between 
life and death for the victim(s). The Cyber Forensic Field Triage Process Model 
(CFFTPM) proposes an onsite or field approach for providing the identification, 
analysis and interpretation of digital evidence in a short time frame, without the 
requirement of having to take the system(s)/media back to the lab for an in-depth 
examination or acquiring a complete forensic image(s). The proposed model 
adheres to commonly held forensic principles, and does not negate the ability 
that once the initial field triage is concluded, the system(s)/storage media be 
transported back to a lab environment for a more thorough examination and 
analysis. The CFFTPM has been successfully used in various real world cases, 
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and its investigative importance and pragmatic approach has been amply 
demonstrated. Furthermore, the derived evidence from these cases has not been 
challenged in the court proceedings where it has been introduced. The current 
article describes the CFFTPM in detail, discusses the model’s forensic 
soundness, investigative support capabilities and practical considerations. 
Keywords: Computer forensics, process model, triage, computer crime, cyber 
crime, digital evidence 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer crime is an unfortunate artifact of today’s wired and global society. 
It is no surprise that individuals involved in deviant and or criminal behavior 
have embraced technology as a method for improving or extending their 
criminal tradecraft. With the proliferation of technology, our notions of 
evidence and what constitutes potential sources of evidence are drastically 
changing. Gone are the days when evidence was primarily document based. 
Today, and going forward, evidence is becoming more electronic or digital 
based. This is true for all investigations, not just those we commonly associate 
with crimes that use or are directed toward a computer, network or IT 
infrastructure.  
There have been several investigative models developed to assist law 
enforcement in dealing with the shift from document based to digital based 
evidence (cf. Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Beebe & Clarke, 2004; Reith, Carr, & 
Gunsch, 2002; Rogers, 2006; Stephenson, 2003). These various models have 
assumed that the entire investigative process for computer forensics would be 
undertaken (see Figure 1). This can be extremely time consuming given the 
volume of data to examine and in most cases it involves the transfer of the 
system(s) or a forensic copy(s) of the data located on the storage media to a lab 
environment for a thorough examination and analysis.  While this method may 
work in situations where time is not overly critical, it is not sufficient in time 
critical situations. Examples of these time critical situations include child 
abductions, missing persons, death threats etc. In these situations the need for 
quick information and investigative leads outweighs the need for an in-depth 
analysis of all the potential digital evidence back in a laboratory environment. 
In order to meet the demand for timely information derived from digital 
sources a different process model is proposed that is based on forensically 
sound principles and at the same time is sensitive to time constraints (i.e., 
critical investigative information can be derived in a short timeframe).  The 
proposed model can be conducted on scene which provides the added benefit 
of having a feedback loop with the investigators; this allows the computer 
forensics analyst to modify their searches based on input from the primary 
investigators and those in direct contact with the suspect. 
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Figure 1 – Traditional Process Models 
2. BACKGROUND  
The development of the current process model was guided not only by the 
perceived need by the law enforcement community, but also from the 
formalization of a novel investigative approach that was being used in real 
investigations by agents working with the Southern Indiana Assistant U.S. 
Attorney’s office – USADA Steve Debrota. This office had been involved in 
several cases where the quick and efficient examination of digital evidence was 
crucial to the case and the investigative leads that were generated on site (at the 
suspect’s dwelling) were critical to the success of the operation, in securing a 
conviction of the offender and to protecting future victims. The USADA’s 
office approached the Cyber Forensic Program housed in the Computer and 
Information Technology Department at Purdue University and the National 
White Collar Crime Center for assistance. The successful and pragmatic 
approach needed to be articulated and structured into a formal process model in 
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order for it to be replicated in other jurisdictions, and in order for it to be 
properly evaluated and matured. The approach has been formalized into the 
computer forensics field triage process model.  
The formalization of the model was evaluated by 20 State and Local Law 
Enforcement Officers from Indiana who took part in a two-day seminar offered 
at Purdue University during the fall of 2005. The model was presented to the 
officers over the course of two days and the feedback was overwhelmingly 
positive.  
3. PROCESS MODEL 
The computer forensics field triage process model (CFFTPM) is defined as:  
Those investigative processes that are conducted within the first few hours of 
an investigation, that provide information used during the suspect interview 
and search execution phase. Due to the need for information to be obtained in a 
relatively short time frame, the model usually involves an on site/field analysis 
of the computer system(s) in question. 
The foci of the model are to: 
1. Find useable evidence immediately; 
2. Identify victims at acute risk; 
3. Guide the ongoing investigation; 
4. Identify potential charges; and 
5. Accurately assess the offender’s danger to society. 
While at the same time protecting the integrity of the evidence and/or potential 
evidence for further examination and analysis. 
Being able to conduct an examination and analysis on scene, in a short period 
of time and provide investigators with time sensitive leads and information 
provides a powerful psychological advantage to the investigative team. 
Suspects are psychologically more vulnerable within the first few hours of their 
initial contact with police, especially when this contact occurs in their place of 
business or dwelling (Yeschke, 2003). They tend to be more cooperative and 
open to answering questions even after being “Mirandized”. This cooperation 
can be critical in certain cases such as abductions, sexual predatory offenses 
etc. What is crucial to the investigator during this initial time period is the 
knowledge of the full extent of the crime and/or involvement of the suspect and 
“triggers” that further increase the suspect’s willingness to talk and cooperate. 
These triggers may be found in the digital evidence located on the suspect’s 
system(s) (e.g., email correspondence, digital maps, pictures, chat logs). 
The CFFTPM uses phases derived from the Carrier and Spafford (2002) 
Integrated Digital Investigation Process model (IDIP) and the Digital Crime 
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Scene Analysis (DCSA) model as developed by Rogers (2006). The phases 
include: planning, triage, usage/user profiles, chronology/timeline, Internet 
activity, and case specific evidence (see Figure 2).  These six phases constitute 
a high level of categorization and each phase has several sub-tasks and 
considerations that vary according to the specifics of the case, file system and 
operating system under investigation, etc. The use of higher order categories 
allows the process model to be generalized across various types of 
investigations that deal with digital evidence. The need for a general model has 
been identified in several studies as a core component of a practical/pragmatic 
approach for law enforcement investigations (ISTS, 2004; Rogers & Seigfried, 
2004; Stambaugh, H., Beaupre, D., Icove, D., Baker, R., Cassaday, W., & 
Williams, W., 2001).  
Before discussing each of the model’s phases it is important that qualifications 
be placed around the use of the CFFTPM, as the model is not appropriate for 
all investigative situations. 
 
Figure 2 -  CFFTPM Phases 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(2) 
 
24 
3.1 Considerations 
As with any other type of investigation there are several considerations that 
must be made prior to deciding the most effective and efficient method. Two 
primary areas of consideration are legal and technical/operational 
considerations. Legal considerations include the scope and particulars of the 
warrant or order. Does the warrant allow for the seizure and removal of the 
system(s)? Is there sufficient particularity in the warrant and application for the 
warrant that allows for an onsite or in situ examination? Are there any 4th 
Amendment issues that need to be addressed? What are the reporting 
obligations to the issuing magistrate or judge? Are there particular discovery 
issues present or anticipated? Another important consideration is whether 
conducting an onsite examination affects the integrity of the original evidence. 
It is only when these and other potential legal issues are sorted out that the 
feasibility of using the CFFTPM can be determined. These legal considerations 
obviously necessitate that investigators and legal counsel work together 
throughout the entire case. 
Technical/operational considerations include but are by no means limited to: 
The type of case? How critical is the time factor? What are the skills and 
abilities of the computer forensic examiners? What type of technology is 
involved (standalone systems, complex networks etc.)? Can the scene be safely 
and effectively controlled? Can the systems in question be powered off or must 
they remain “live”? What is the technical skill and knowledge level of the 
suspect? Do the computer forensic examiners have the proper equipment for 
onsite examinations? As was stated with legal considerations, these questions 
need to be considered before deciding to use the CFFTPM approach. 
It is also important to understand that the CFFTPM does not preclude 
transporting the system(s) or storage media back to a lab environment for a 
more thorough and exacting examination and analysis. The procedures used in 
the CFFTPM adhere to the forensic principles of minimizing the contamination 
of the original scene and evidence, maintaining the integrity of digital 
evidence, maintaining the chain of custody of evidence, and complying with 
rules of evidence for admissibility at the Federal and State levels. In many 
cases a two step process is appropriate and prudent, where step one is the 
CFFTPM conducted at the scene to provide time sensitive investigative and 
interview leads and then step two being a secondary more traditional 
examination and analysis back at the lab in order to make a more exact 
determination of events and evidentiary locations in a more controlled 
environment. 
4. PHASES 
Due to length constraints the discussion will only provide a brief description of 
the six phases and key sub-tasks. The primary investigative/examination 
considerations that are pertinent for each of the phases will also be presented. 
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4.1 Planning  
The first phase in the CFFTPM is proper prior planning. Ideally, a lead 
investigator will have a matrix that quantifies the various possibilities of the 
crime scene, the suspect and the digital evidence and qualifies the expertise of 
the various investigators on the investigation team. For the lead investigator, 
this matrix is used to define what is known and what is not known thus aiding 
in determining what is wanted to be known. Similar to a Situation paragraph of 
a military Operations Order (OpOrd), this matrix identifies the “enemy” and 
“friendly” situations providing preemptive case intelligence. In the OpOrd, the 
enemy is defined characteristically by collecting intelligence through the 
acronym SALUTE: Strength, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, and 
Equipment. This same acronym can be used in gathering case intelligence 
about the enemy/suspect prior to arriving at the crime scene.  
Strength initially determines the suspect count and any other involved cohorts 
(specific numbers can be helpful), but could also include known or possible 
capabilities of the suspect. Activity defines the specific actions of the suspect 
(even small details could later be important). Location is not only the physical 
location of the scene, but also the virtual possibilities of cyberspace. Uniform 
relates more to the military, but in terms of cyberspace it can include email 
addresses, Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), usernames, passwords, 
network domains and other related deterministic markings, symbols, or 
corporate or agency identifiers. Time obviously builds upon other previously 
gathered case intelligence providing the chronological scope for investigative 
searches. Finally, Equipment covers the various types of wired and wireless 
hardware devices and software applications that can be expected when 
approaching the digital crime scene. Dependent upon the case intelligence 
determined from the SALUTE, the lead investigator will have many specific 
decisions to make prior to arriving at the crime scene.  
Once the enemy/suspect elements of the SALUTE matrix are determined, the 
lead investigator can then identify friendly information for attacking this crime 
scene. From the OpOrd, this section of the matrix includes the mission of the 
investigation, the identification of the necessary personnel to provide the 
expertise for the investigation, and the knowledge of how to handle the 
unexpected. The mission of the investigation is normally determined by the 
type of crime committed in turn determining the level of investigation and the 
level of expertise necessary for the investigation. If the crime warrants 
expertise in multiple physical and virtual locations, multiple wired and wireless 
networks, multiple OS, personal digital technologies, or other specific 
technical needs, the investigator can plan accordingly. However, if there are 
unknowns in the investigation, it is imperative that the lead investigator 
determines who else can be contacted to aid in the investigation. With this 
compiled situational case intelligence, both about the suspect and the 
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investigative team, the lead investigator can then formulate a plan of attack for 
determining what evidence is to be sought after and used to further the 
investigation. 
4.2. Triage 
Once the appropriate planning has been completed, the investigative process 
moves to those phases that deal more directly with the actual suspect or crime 
scene (depending upon the case).  For the sake of our discussion it is assumed 
that the scene has been properly secured and controlled. Here the scene refers 
to both the physical and the digital (cf. Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Lee, 
Palmbach, & Miller, 2001; Rogers, 2006). 
Since time is a crucial factor in the CFTTPM, it is extremely important that 
some sort of initial prioritization be undertaken. An effective and time-tested 
approach is to follow the medical triage model.  In the medical field triage 
refers to: 
“A process for sorting injured people into groups based on their need for or 
likely benefit from immediate medical treatment. Triage is used in hospital 
emergency rooms, on battlefields, and at disaster sites when limited 
medical resources must be allocated.” (AHD, 2000) 
For our purposes triage can be distilled down to: 
A process in which things are ranked in terms of importance or priority. 
Essentially, those items, pieces of evidence or potential containers of 
evidence that are the most important or the most volatile need to be dealt 
with first. 
The triage phase is fundamental to the process model and along with proper 
planning it is the foundation upon which the other phases are built. The 
investigator needs to re-verify that the CFFTPM approach is still valid. 
Potential containers of evidence (e.g., computer systems, storage media and 
devices) need to be identified and prioritized based on the criteria of potential 
relevant evidence that can be obtained in a reasonably short time frame, and/or 
evidence with a short time to live (e.g., data in volatile memory, process tables, 
routing tables, temporary files systems). The investigators and interviewers 
who are dealing directly with the suspect or witnesses need to be providing 
direct input to the computer forensic examiner at this stage. This ensures that 
correct prioritizations and assumptions are being made. 
For the remainder of the discussion it will be assumed that the computer 
forensic examiner has access to a forensic examination workstation or laptop 
that they have brought, a hardware write blocker to ensure that any storage 
media that is examined is done so in read only mode (thus ensuring that no 
contamination is occurring), and the computer forensic examiner has access to 
software tools that allow them to conduct field examinations (e.g., EnCase, 
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FTK, ProDiscover, Sleuthkit, Filehound). 
4.3 Usage/User Profiles 
Once a system or storage media has been identified and prioritized during the 
triage phase, the actual examination and analysis are conducted. When 
compelling evidence is found on digital media, it is essential to show a link 
between that evidence and a specific, identifiable suspect1. In some cases, this 
is almost a fait accompli; for example, when it can be clearly shown that only 
one person had physical access to a PC. In many cases, multiple persons have 
access to a PC, making it necessary to find and examine digital artifacts and 
their properties to ascertain which individual or individuals are responsible for, 
or even had knowledge of, incriminating data found on the storage media.  
Often it is necessary to place artifacts in context with verifiable real world 
events.  The payoff can be significant.  A suspect presented with clear evidence 
indicating that he or she, and no other person is responsible for evidence 
recovered during an interview may feel compelled to admit their guilt.   
This challenge has always existed, and is an essential element of most 
“traditional” examinations of digital evidence.  In the context of the computer 
forensics field triage process model, the challenge is not only to do this 
quickly, but to expeditiously determine if it can even be done within the time 
constraints. (In some cases, the specifics of the evidence can obviate the need 
for this evaluation, for example when contraband files are found only in a 
specific user’s home directory).  A thorough knowledge of user profiles and 
artifacts relating to usage, are essential to accomplishing this goal. 
It is not always necessary or fruitful to evaluate user profiles.  In determining 
the need and the most time efficient approach, several questions need to be 
asked: How many people use (have access to) the PC? How many user 
accounts are there? The answers to the first two are often not the same, leading 
to a third question, how many or which accounts are shared by more than one 
individual? Obviously in any case where more than one individual is able to 
log in to the same account, evaluating user profiles in and of itself, will not be 
sufficient to establish culpability for, or even a suspect’s knowledge of 
incriminating artifacts.  It may be necessary to use the dates and times 
associated with incriminating artifacts and put them in context with the dates 
and times a suspect had access to the PC, or could reliably said not to have had 
access to a PC.   Special care must be taken when attaching significance to 
dates and times recovered from digital evidence.  This will be discussed further 
in the “Timeline” section of this paper. At the other extreme, if it can be firmly 
established that only one individual had access to a PC, the examiner can 
                                                 
1 The discussion will be constrained to standalone systems running a Microsoft Windows 
environment, since this represents the majority of the training and systems encountered by law 
enforcement investigators (Rogers & Scarborough, 2006). 
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dispense with evaluating user profiles, and allocate the time budgeted to more 
fruitful avenues of search. 
Loosely put, a user profile is a collection of files, folders, registry keys, and file 
properties that are exclusively associated with a unique user account.  The 
value of, and speed at which these items can be evaluated will vary widely 
depending on case specifics, available tools, and specific knowledge and 
experience of the examiner.   
4.3.1 Home Directory 
In Microsoft Widows operating systems, the most obvious user related artifact 
is the “Home Directory”.  By default, the home directory is only accessible 
only by the associated user account.  Also by default, the location of stored 
files associated with various applications is set to a subfolder inside the home 
directory.  The presence of incriminating files in the suspect’s home directory 
or one of it’s subfolders (Including such notables as “desktop” “my 
documents” and “favorites”) is a reliable indicator that only the suspect (or 
anyone who could log onto that account) had access to those files. 
Additionally, the creation of a subdirectory structure with unique subfolder 
names can go a long way towards showing knowledge of and culpability for 
evidentiary objects found in the subdirectory structure (DeBrota, 2005). 
4.3.2 File Properties (security) 
It may be useful and time-efficient to check ownership and security properties 
of objects with known evidentiary value. The ability to set and read security 
permissions is not available in FAT, and is off by default in Windows XP 
(National White Collar Crime Center, 2003), even when the NTFS file system 
is used.  When NTFS is used, and the feature turned on, a file’s security 
properties, most notably “owner” and “permissions” may be useful in 
establishing which account had access to, or even created that particular file 
(National White Collar Crime Center, 2003).  When a file is created, the user 
account logged on is recorded as the “owner” as part of the file’s security 
descriptor (This can be changed only if an Administrator “takes ownership” of 
the file, in which case the Administrator is recorded as the owner).  
Permissions may also be of limited usefulness in establishing culpability. Only 
those accounts with the permission to do so may access an object, however this 
can be one or more user accounts, and the accounts that have permission to the 
object may change over time.  An account that had “read” access on the 25th of 
January might not have had that same access on the 24th.  
4.3.3 Registry 
The registry can be a trap, causing the needless expenditure of valuable time, if 
the examiner does not have a precise idea of what they are looking for and 
exactly where to go to find it.  On the other hand, a knowledgeable examiner 
with a clear vision of what information they want to recover can find several 
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highly valuable items in less than a few minutes (National White Collar Crime 
Center, 2005).  For example, the HKEY_USERS\suspect’s 
SID\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs key and associated sub-keys contain a fairly 
comprehensive list of files that were opened while that account was logged on.  
This is a strong indicator that a suspect had knowledge of all files that were 
viewed, but requires that the examiner knows or can quickly and reliably 
identify the NTUSER.DAT file associated with the user’s account.     
Depending on the circumstances and resources available, examining the user 
profile may be the most costly part of the examination in terms of time 
expended, however it is often an indispensable operation as well. 
4.4 Chronology/Timeline 
The chronological scope of the investigation can be defined by the case 
intelligence. In an investigation, digital evidence is defined by its temporal 
value, known as MAC times (Casey, 2004). Without going into a detailed 
narrative of the specifics of MAC times specifically to each OS, the following 
are some general guidelines for Windows MAC Times. Windows MAC times 
are defined in the FAT32 and NTFS file systems as: 
• Modification is defined by when a file contents has been changed  
• Access time is defined by when a file was viewed 
• Created time is defined by when a file was created 
Although MAC times appear simple, it is well-documented (Casey, 2004; 
Farmer & Venema, 2005;Vacca, 2002) that there are many inconsistencies 
with MAC times and there are various other vulnerabilities when describing 
other vendor specific operating systems, such as those used on personal digital 
technologies devices (e.g., PDAs, Cellphones, MP3 players). 
Once an investigator gains access to the files in question and their individual 
MAC times, they can start to qualify their searches, thus quantifying their 
evidence (Casey, 2004).  For the CFFTPM, several quantifications should be 
examined by sorting the files on their various MAC times within the 
chronological scope of the investigation. The first such quantification includes 
the time periods of normal use by the suspect and other known users of the 
computer or device (Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005).  This can be 
obtained by correlating known users accessing the computer with files that 
have been modified, accessed or created during those times. Organization by 
user or by time period helps to quantify who was doing what during what time 
periods. Such organization may also provide time periods that stand out or look 
unique. These types of unique time periods could be studied outward in an 
attempt to find other significant relationships or value. 
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Another quantification includes the identification and analysis of software 
applications and data files used or accessed during qualified times of interest 
(Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005; Vacca, 2002). Again, this can be 
obtained by correlating known users with MAC times possibly providing 
unique time periods that could be of significant value. Organization of 
applications or files within a certain time period quantify activities that 
occurred during these time periods. An application or file that is accessed prior 
to, during or after a criminal incident can be a major indication of involvement 
or intent. 
Finally, the third quantification includes the identification and analysis of 
recent shortcuts and stored information (Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 
2005; Vacca, 2002). These could include, but are not limited to items on the 
desktop, commonly used software applications, and the various locations of 
Internet browser cookies, cache, and the index.dat file. Note that various 
Internet structures (cookies, cache and the index.dat file) can be very useful in 
determining chronological intelligence in that these provide much more time-
based evidence than just MAC times. Specifically, each Index.dat file provides 
date-time stamps for each Internet server request.  
For clarification, it should be noted that time is maintained differently in 
different operating systems and versions, system clocks do drift and are easily 
corrupted, and knowledge of time zones and time changes is essential to any 
digital investigation  (Casey, 2001; Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005; 
Vacca, 2002). Finally, in defining the case through chronology, there is a need 
to establish a provenance of the information and correlate events based on an 
absolute time determined by some piece of physical evidence (Casey, 2004; 
Vacca, 2002).  
4.5 Internet  
Almost every case will require an examination of artifacts associated with 
Internet activity, such as instant messaging (IM), e-mail and web browsing.  
The value, time cost, and time criticality will vary widely, depending on 
circumstances including the specific applications involved, type of activity 
being examined, and whether the PC being examined belongs to a suspect or a 
victim (e.g., in a missing persons case).  An effective practice is for the 
computer forensic examiner to evaluate what type of Internet activities they 
believe the suspect (or victim) was involved in, and to evaluate if and how each 
of those activities relates to the case.   Types of activities may include web 
browsing, e-mail, instant messaging, reading or posting to USENET 
newsgroups, trading files. 
4.5.1 Browser Artifacts 
While the specifics vary, most web browsing applications store some method 
for storing “cookies”, either as a file or as separate files, some means of storing 
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temporary Internet files, and some means of storing user information and 
preferences, such as typed Uniform Resource Locator (URLs) and “favorites”. 
The specific content of individual cookies is determined by each individual 
website and is rarely of evidentiary value.  In most cases, the evidentiary value 
of a cookie is limited to its name. Typically, the name of a cookie will match 
the URL of the site that deposited the cookie, indicating that the PC had visited 
that site at some point in the past.  This does not go to show intent as the 
cookie will be created whether the browser was redirected from another site, or 
intentionally pointed to the site with a typed URL. Dates and times associated 
with cookies may help to determine when a site was visited and can be useful 
in creating investigative timelines. 
Temporary Internet files are essentially cached copies of web page components 
(often graphics) stored on the local PC.  The investigative value is that these 
files are stored locally without the intent or intervention of the user, and that 
some files, for example contraband images, are of evidentiary value in and of 
themselves.  An investigator must keep in mind that these files are easily 
cleared out by most browsing applications, or with third party tools. Most 
importantly, investigators must weigh the potential value against the time it 
will take to search through even a moderately populated cache.  Examiners 
should expect a search of temporary Internet files to take hours or days.  In 
many cases, that requires more time than the examiner has. 
A web browser’s storage of user information and preferences can be a quick 
source of useful information.  In cases where “Internet Explorer” is the 
browser, the index.dat file can contain a running record of sites visited, 
including access to web based e-mail (but not e-mail content), and even local 
files.  The examples below (some information has been redacted) all represent 
data pulled from an index.dat file in less than five minutes, using a free third-
party tool (see Figure 3).  The “User Name” in each case, indicates the name of 
the windows account that “owned” the index.dat file in question.  
4.5.2 E-mail Artifacts  
E-mail artifacts may be of enormous evidentiary value, but can require a very 
expensive investment in time. Procedures for examining e-mail and extracting 
useful data are usually specific to the particular e-mail client, and can be time 
consuming to implement.  If extraction of e-mail is successful, even a cursory 
screening of all the e-mail in a suspect’s mailbox could take many hours.  If 
web-based e-mail is used, there is often no local storage of e-mail artifacts.  
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============================================= 
URL       : http://www.XXXXXX.com 
Title        : New Page 1 
Hits         : 17 
Modified Date     : 10/4/2005 9:05:35 PM 
Expiration Date   : 10/30/2005 9:05:36 PM 
User Name         : xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows a user visiting a site 17 times, most recently on 10/4/2005 
 
============================================= 
URL    : http://images.google.com/images?q=kitties&hl=en 
Title    : kitties - Google Image Search 
Hits      : 7 
Modified Date    : 10/4/2005 9:09:46 PM 
Expiration Date  : 10/30/2005 9:02:38 PM 
User Name        : xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows that a user performed a google image search on the term “kitties” 7 times, 
most recently on 10/4/2005  
 
============================================= 
URL             : http://us.f307.mail.yahoo.com/ym/ShowFolder?rb=Inbox&reset=1&YY=85059 
Title             : Yahoo! Mail - xxxxxxxx@yahoo.com 
Hits              : 21 
Modified Date     : 10/4/2005 9:06:37 PM 
Expiration Date   : 10/30/2005 9:06:38 PM 
User Name         : xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows a user accessing their yahoo account for the 21st time on 10/4/2005. 
 
============================================= 
URL               : file:///D:/Program%20Files/mIRC/logs/%23Beginner.EFnet.log 
Title             :  
Hits              : 1 
Modified Date     : 10/4/2005 9:44:39 PM 
Expiration Date   : 10/30/2005 9:37:32 PM 
User Name         :xxxxxx 
============================================= 
This example shows the user accessing a file (in this case, an IRC chat log, but could be any type 
file) on the local drive for the first time on 10/4/2005. 
 
Figure 3 - Index.dat Examples 
4.5.3 Instant Messaging Artifacts 
Most instant messaging clients maintain some type of contact information, and 
have the capability to record and store logs of the conversations that take place 
between the user and his or her online contacts.  In most cases, this logging 
capability is off by default but can, and often is, turned on by the user.  Contact 
information for most IM applications is maintained at the server, and may not 
be found on the local PC.  Chat logs can contain a wealth of data, including the 
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conversation itself, as well as the screen names of other parties.  A single chat 
log may contain hours of conversation.  A thorough examination of multiple 
logs may bear a prohibitive cost in time.  If it is necessary to examine chat 
logs, it is important for the examiner to have a clear idea of what he or she is 
looking for.  String search tools should be implemented as much as possible.  
A “traditional“ examination would likely involve a thorough examination of all 
of these, and many other artifacts.  The mandates of the CFFTPM require that 
the examiner judiciously evaluate the potential benefit of examining each of 
these artifacts with the time cost of doing so.  
4.6 Case Specific Evidence 
It is important for the computer forensic examiner to be able to adjust the focus 
of every examination to the specifics of that case.  This is a skill set in and of 
itself, and requires the ability to reconcile a number of conflicting requirements 
in the manner most appropriate not just to a type of case, but to each specific 
set of circumstances.  There are several practices that can facilitate an effective 
optimization of resources. A computer forensic examiner should be able to 
evaluate time resources, utilize pre-raid intelligence, customize search goals, 
and prioritize search goals.  
Of all the resources available to the examiner, time is usually in shortest 
supply.  One consideration when taking stock is whether the time requirement 
is “bounded” or “unbounded“.  Is there a defined deadline (“bounded”) beyond 
which the search is halted, or the evidence loses all value?  Is the mandate to 
find evidence as soon as possible, but even if it takes days (“unbounded”)? For 
example, a permissive search might only be allowed until the end of an 
interview, whereas the search of a missing person’s PC might be conducted as 
rapidly as possible, but still go on for hours.  Time is clearly of the essence in 
both cases, but the lack of a time limit in the unbounded case can justify some 
avenues of investigation that would not be feasible in a bounded situation.  In 
all cases, time is an expensive commodity.  The time cost of any examination 
activity must be weighed against the potential for fruitful results of that 
activity.  As a general rule, it is usually best to perform those tasks which can 
be accomplished most quickly first. 
The value of planning and pre-raid intelligence cannot be over-emphasized.  
Reliable information on search terms, contacts, types of activities, applications 
used, etc. in advance of the search can allow the examiner to develop at least 
some search strategies before arrival on scene.  Every minute saved in this 
manner is potentially another minute available to conduct the search itself.    
It is difficult to say with certainty which specific type of digital artifact is the 
optimum site to search for a given type of case; however some types of 
artifacts are generally more likely to produce relevant information for specific 
types of cases.  The example cases summarized below are not intended to be a 
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comprehensive list of the type of case or of all recommended approaches.   
 
5. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
The highest priority should obviously be given to actual instances of child 
pornography on the drive. A graphic viewing utility that quickly displays large 
quantities of thumbnails from graphic and audiovisual files can help speed up 
the task of searching the drive directly. It may be helpful to take a quick look at 
the directory structure, searching for indications of cataloged, sorted storage of 
contraband material. If Internet activity is involved, many web browser 
artifacts can be searched fairly quickly to identify contact with incriminating 
web sites.  Instances of child pornography may potentially be found in 
temporary Internet files, however the time required to search through these 
files is likely to be prohibitive. If distribution of child pornography is 
suspected, it may be prudent to search for artifacts associated with IRC 
FServes or peer to peer file sharing applications (DeBrota, 2005).  E-mail and 
USENET newsgroup postings may also be associated with distribution of child 
pornography; however this is often very time-consuming and should be 
considered carefully. 
6. DRUG ACTIVITY 
A quick search of the drive for spreadsheets, documents or databases is often a 
sensible use of time (unless the number of files found is prohibitive).  These 
files may contain sales records, customer information, drug-making 
instructions, or lists of precursor chemicals.  If time can be allotted to do so, it 
may be fruitful to examine Internet artifacts for Internet searches on drug-
related terms, and for online transactions involving purchases of precursor 
chemicals or equipment. It may be possible to find drug-related e-mail or 
instant messaging artifacts, however this will be time consuming – especially 
so because it will likely require manual screening of message content.  
7. FINANCIAL CRIMES 
A cursory search of the drive for documents and images (specifically images of 
checks or other potentially fraudulent financial instruments) might be at the top 
of the list.  Documents could include invoices or other financial records. 
Installed financial applications, such as quicken or MS Money and their 
associated records may be a fruitful source of evidence. 
Within the constraints of the factors previously highlighted, the examiner must 
efficiently prioritize the search goals from the beginning.  Some considerations 
will be constant.  Time and speed will almost always be the most important 
consideration.  Forensically sound practices must always be observed. System 
date and time, and time-zone information from the suspect’s system should 
always be examined and documented.  To the extent practical, the examiner 
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should prioritize search goals to focus on applications the suspect is known to 
have used or reasonably presumed to have used in relation to the suspected 
illegal activity based on available intelligence. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The computer forensic field triage process model (CFFTPM) is a formalization 
of real world investigative approaches that have distilled into a formal process 
model. At the heart of the model is the notion that some investigations are 
extremely time sensitive; hours can literally mean the difference between life 
and death for a victim or the escape of the suspect. Most law enforcement cases 
today involve digital evidence of some kind. We are truly a digital nation and 
as such our lives (the good and the bad) are reflected in technology and the bits 
and bytes. Correspondingly, digital evidence is a primary source of critical 
information and investigative leads that are required within the first few hours 
of many investigations. 
While the investigative approaches that were used to develop the model came 
primarily from child pornography cases, the model is general enough to be 
used across a wide spectrum of investigations. The six primary phases of the 
CFFTPM (planning, triage, usage/user profiles, chronology/timeline, email & 
IM, and case specific evidence) are important in such diverse cases as financial 
fraud, identity theft, cyber stalking and murder. The various sub-phases or 
tasks under each primary phase need to be modified based on the specifics of 
each investigation.  The tasks and considerations discussed under each of the 
phases act as examples of the decision making process that needs to take place 
– sensitivity of time vs. quality and importance of the evidence derived. 
The CFFTPM is consistent with the various theoretical models that have been 
developed within the field of digital forensic science. By following the 
CFFTPM a computer forensic examiner has not precluded a more thorough 
traditional examination and analysis back in the lab. The procedures used on 
site are forensically sound, maintain the chain of custody, and comply with 
Federal and State rules for the admissibility of evidence.  
One of the biggest advantages of the CFFTPM (very practical and pragmatic) 
is due to the fact the model was developed in reverse of most other models in 
the area. The investigators in the field matured their instinctive approaches 
based on actual trial and error, cases, court decisions and the direction from 
prosecutors. The CFFTPM merely aggregated these approaches and articulated 
them into a more formal methodology; still maintaining the investigative 
essence and the key components that have been battle tested. 
Just as it has been said that “one software tool does not a computer examiner 
make”, only possessing one investigative process model is equally as limiting. 
Computer forensic examiners need a repertoire of tools and just as important, a 
repertoire of examination and investigative approaches. The CFFTPM is not 
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the ultimate solution for every case; it should only be used where appropriate 
and only after carefully weighing the legal and technical considerations that 
were discussed.  In those instances where it has been employed it has been 
extremely effective! 
“Education never ends, Watson. It is a series of lessons, with the 
greatest for the last” 
(Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the Red Circle) 
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